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Executive Summary  
 
Beyond its history of military coups and incomplete civilian oversight of its armed forces, 
Turkey has struggled with defining an independent international security policy. Its 
perception of U.S./NATO security guarantees has historically shaped its decision to 
either prioritize collective defense or seek solutions in indigenous or regional security 
arrangements. As part its domestic political transformation during the past decade, 
Turkey has decreased its reliance on NATO, leading to questions among observers about 
Turkey’s future strategic orientation away from the West. 
 
This brief argues that Turkey’s strategic objectives have indeed evolved in the recent past 
and that this is apparent in the mismatch between the country’s general security policy 
objectives and the outcomes of its policies on nuclear issues. At present, nuclear weapons 
do not serve a compelling function in Turkish policymakers’ thinking, beyond the 
country’s commitment to the status quo in NATO nuclear policy. Since nuclear 
deterrence is secondary to conventional deterrence, Turkey’s policies on nuclear issues 
are predominantly shaped by non-nuclear considerations. These decisions, in the absence 
of careful consideration of nuclear weapons, increase nuclear risks. This brief explores 
how Turkey could formulate more effective and lower risk nuclear policies than it 
currently does by employing cooperative security measures and how such a reorientation 
could strengthen to its overall security policy in the process.  
 
 
The Policy Problem  
 
Turkey is a non-nuclear member of a nuclear alliance in a region where nuclear proliferation is 
of particular concern. It is also the only North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member 
that borders the Middle East. As such, Turkish policy makers have chosen not to rely solely on 
NATO guarantees in addressing its regional security challenges. However, Turkey has not been 
able to formulate a security policy that reconciles this quest for independence with its NATO 
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membership, its bilateral relationship with the United States, and its Mideast regional 
engagement.  
 
This general incoherence is readily apparent when assessing a range of nuclear-related decisions 
facing Turkish policymakers today. Turkey’s security policies have little explicit emphasis on 
nuclear weapons, which officials argue provides flexibility. This brief instead argues that the 
lack of well-defined, national nuclear policies creates signaling problems and contributes to 
concerns about Turkey’s broader actions and intentions. 
 
 
Background: Turkey’s Attitudes Toward U.S./NATO Extended Deterrence  
 
A series of formative events both during and after the Cold War functioned as solidarity tests and 
“trust-breaking” incidents for Turkey, leading it to conclude that it has different security needs 
than the rest of the NATO alliance.  
 
During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the U.S. unilateral decision to withdraw the Jupiter 
missiles deployed in Turkey without consulting Turkish officials led to frustration and doubts 
about the U.S. commitment to Turkish security. In a more drastic turn of events, in June 1964, 
U.S. President Lyndon Johnson warned Turkey not to intervene in Cyprus and threatened that the 
United States would not protect Turkey if the Soviets became entangled. When Turkey deployed 
forces in Cyprus as part of a 1974 unilateral offensive, the United States imposed an arms 
embargo that lasted until September 1978. Both the embargo and Turkey’s military vulnerability 
during the Cyprus intervention continue to shape the mindset of Turkish policymakers, who 
argue for a strong, domestic defense industry.  
 
While Turkey actively contributed to NATO’s post-Cold War out-of-area contingency 
operations, including the 1991 Gulf War, its vulnerability to Saddam Hussein’s missile inventory 
and NATO’s slow response to Ankara’s request for air and missile defense reinforcements 
decreased Turkey’s confidence in NATO security guarantees. After the Turkish parliament 
refused to allow U.S. troops to cross into northern Iraq through Turkey as part of the 2003 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, NATO hesitated to deploy Patriot missile batteries and Airborne 
Warning and Control System (AWACS) surveillance planes to Turkey, raising further questions.   
 
President Obama tried to reinforce Turkey’s ties to NATO during his April 2010 visit to the 
country. He referred to the country’s “model strategic partnership” and called for additional 
instruments to contribute to regional stability and strengthen the NATO alliance through 
multilateralism.1 However, Turkey’s and US/NATO’s threat perceptions have only diverged as 
Turkey’s economic and political ambitions in the Middle East have grown. Turkish security 
policymaking no longer favors isolation from the Middle East but rather promotes engagement 
outside NATO to enhance Turkish strategic interests. Yet, Turkey’s limited power and the 
uncertainties and complexities of Mideast political and security dilemmas, including the Syrian 
civil war and the rise of ISIS, have raised the price of Turkish regional engagement. 
                                                
1 Namik Tan, “Turkish-US strategic partnership,” Hurriyet Daily News, December 1, 2011.  
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Turkey’s Strategic Objectives on Nuclear Issues and Problems in Policy Formulation  
 
Turkey faces several pressing nuclear-related decisions relating to U.S. tactical nuclear weapons 
deployed in Turkey, national air and ballistic missile defense, and Iran’s nuclear program. Based 
on Turkey’s stance on nuclear issues, one could assume that its strategic objectives include:  
 
1. Maintaining a minimum nuclear deterrent by keeping U.S. tactical nuclear weapons at the 
Incirlik Airbase; 
2. Eliminating Turkey’s vulnerability to aerial threats arising from the Middle East by 
strengthening its air and missile defenses; and 
3. Preventing a nuclear-armed Iran from altering the balance of power in the region.  
 
However, a closer look suggests that Turkish decision making on nuclear issues instead reflects 
the central, non-nuclear principles of Turkish security policymaking. These include: 
 
1. Maintaining the stability and continuity of the U.S.-Turkey strategic partnership and of 
NATO’s security guarantees; 
2. Developing sophisticated indigenous defense technologies to increase Turkey’s political 
autonomy in security policy; and 
3. Increasing Turkey’s regional influence by partnering with regional actors to counter 
security concerns unique to Turkish interests outside of NATO.  
 
The misalignment between Turkey’s security policies on nuclear issues and its broader strategic 
objectives derives from a widening gap among the U.S., NATO, and Turkish strategic interests 
in the region. It also owes significantly to Turkey’s quest under the leadership of the AKP party 
to strengthen its domestic defense industry. 
 
Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Turkey. Turkish thinking on the future of U.S. nuclear weapons 
deployed in Europe, including the 50 B-61 gravity bombs at Incirlik Air Base, is crucial to 
understanding Turkey’s nuclear policies. The failed coup attempt in July 2016 and the 
detainment of the Incirlik base commander reignited the concerns about the vulnerability of these 
weapons. While the probability of unauthorized use of these nuclear weapons remains very low, 
the risk is not zero. However, Turkish policy makers continue to lack confidence in U.S./NATO 
security guarantees and to fear abandonment. Turkish officials believe that maintaining tactical 
nuclear weapons at Incirlik will strengthen the U.S. political commitment to Turkish security—a 
non-nuclear objective. Yet neither the Turkish Armed Forces nor the AKP government has 
signaled an intent to adopt a nuclear mission despite Turkey’s acquisition of F-35 joint strike 
fighters which is in concert with the B61-12 Life Extension Program. Indeed, Turkish officials 
have signaled that if there was consensus within NATO on removing all U.S. nuclear weapons 
from Europe, not just Turkey, they would not block the decision. 
 
As the nuclear weapons at Incirlik remain strictly under U.S. command and control they do not 
serve the Turkish desire to maintain a minimum nuclear deterrent. In principle, Turkey would 
welcome a WMD-free zone in the Middle East and a world free of nuclear weapons in the long 
term, yet its general ambivalence on nuclear policies in the medium term leads some observers to 
debate whether Turkey would consider developing its own nuclear weapons in the future, 
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especially if NATO’s nuclear policy changed and U.S. extended deterrence was degraded. 
Another factor frequently named as potential motivation for Turkey to develop its own nuclear 
weapons would be a nuclear-armed Iran leading to a “nuclear domino” or “proliferation cascade” 
in the region. Despite these possibilities, Turkey has neither expressed the desire nor acquired the 
capabilities to develop nuclear weapons.  
 
Ballistic Missile Defense. Repeated delays in the dispatch of Patriot antiballistic systems for 
Turkish use have led some Turkish officials to doubt whether they can entirely depend on NATO 
and to argue for Turkey to develop its own national air and missile defense capabilities. While 
Turkey hosts an X-band early warning radar in Kurecik as part of the NATO ballistic missile 
defense architecture, the existing architecture doesn’t provide defense of eastern Turkey, 
providing another reason for Turkish development of such systems. 
 
Because Turkey emphasizes maintaining the independence of Turkish defense industries and 
modernizing its military it has relied on technology transfer as its primary defense procurement 
strategy. However, AKP officials have been considering the possibility of indigenously 
developing long-range missile and air defense systems—technically challenging and expensive 
technologies—without taking into consideration the strategic implications of such a decision. 
When Turkey cancelled its initial missile defense deal with China in 2015, Turkey’s top defense 
procurement official stated that Turkey’s air and missile defense system assessment is based on 
enhancing the domestic defense sector and technology development, and not on Turkey’s 
security objectives or the political implications of such decisions.2 Both Undersecretary Demir 
and President Erdogan have repeatedly stated that Turkey would need both offensive and 
defensive missiles for an effective deterrent.  
  
Officials do not talk about Turkey’s quest for defense modernization as a way to better 
contribute to NATO, but rather as an act of independence in response to their lack of confidence 
in NATO guarantees. Turkey’s vulnerability to ISIS rocket attacks on border towns demonstrates 
its precarious position. Yet officials offer few details about the immediacy of the long-range 
ballistic missile threats that they expect to face, whether the proposed new systems would be 
effective in addressing these threats, or whether the new systems could create a security dilemma 
and promote horizontal missile proliferation. Given the reluctance of foreign producers to 
address Turkey’s technology transfer demands beyond a stop-gap acquisition, it is not clear that 
Turkish industry would be up for the job of developing these capabilities domestically, as 
developing the advanced technological capabilities required for long-range air and ballistic 
missile defense would be a large technological leap. 
 
Iran’s Nuclear Program. A major objective of Turkish security policymaking is ensuring 
regional engagement to address security concerns unique to Turkey. An example of this 
objective has been Turkey’s pursuit of a stable relationship with Iran, particularly by maintaining 
close economic ties. Throughout negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran regarding Iran’s 
nuclear program, Turkish leaders consistently underlined Iran’s right to enrichment technologies 
and to developing peaceful nuclear energy and opposed any military action and financial 
sanctions. This, despite not being directly involved in the talks. Turkey was particularly 
                                                
2 Dr. Ismail Demir, Undersecretary for Defense Industries, “Stratejik Hava Savunma Sistemleri ve Turkiye’nin Yol 
Haritasi,” SETA Ankara, October 25, 2015. 
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concerned about the possibility of a U.S./Israeli preemptive strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities. 
Turkish officials also criticized Iran for its initial lack of transparency in compliance with its 
IAEA obligations yet argued that a diplomatic solution on the nuclear issue, as it put forward in 
the Turkey-Brazil deal with Tehran in 2010, was the only viable option. 
 
Despite the desire for further regional engagement, Turkey does not have a clear roadmap 
following the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action about how to formulate 
a security policy toward Iran, particularly given the stark differences in their sets of allies in the 
Syrian conflict. While the government and the public generally do not perceive the Iranian 
nuclear program as a threat, some in Turkey’s traditional security establishment— military 






To address its crisis of confidence with NATO, redefine its strategic partnership with the United 
States, and adopt a more clear, cautious approach toward the Middle East, Turkey will need to 
transform its external security policy making. Steps it could take in this direction toward nuclear 
issues, could include: 
 
(1) Implementing policies on nuclear issues that don’t rely on conventional deterrence as 
justification. Turkish thinking on nuclear weapons should be formulated on carefully considered 
principles that are not subsidiary to other policy concerns. 
 
(2) The reevaluation and emphasis of Turkey’s security concerns and security needs, including 
which threats are most urgent and what strategies would be most useful in addressing them 
within the alliance.  
 
(3) Emphasizing cooperation rather than coercion to counter perceived threats by, for instance, 
minimizing risks from miscalculation that could lead to escalation and deteriorate Turkey’s 
security. If Turkey were given concrete security guarantees, i.e. enhanced U.S.-Turkey defense 
cooperation and reassurances for multilateral defense against Russia, it would likely support the 
removal of nuclear weapons from Incirlik, since they have no military value in addressing 
Turkey’s security threats. These conventional military guarantees would instead address 
Turkey’s most immediate security concerns regarding the ongoing war in Syria and Iraq, 
especially the vulnerability along the border. Such concrete guarantees would also buttress the 
U.S.-Turkey partnership and alleviate Turkey’s concern that its security interests are not being 
taken into consideration.  
 
(4) Separating conventional air defenses from ballistic missile defenses, and relying on NATO 
defense assets as needed without investing in longer range indigenous capabilities with high 
technological barriers, high costs, and strategic implications. Turkey can better achieve its 
objective of decreasing its vulnerability to short-range aerial threats with short-range air defenses 
and real-time surveillance rather than by pursuing ballistic missile defense. The most immediate 
CISSM Policy Brief | Turkey’s Nonnuclear Decisions on Nuclear Issues
   
6 
aerial threats to Turkish territory from Syria and Iraq, are rockets and shells, not ballistic 
missiles.   
(5) Recognizing the impact of their decision making on nuclear issues (e.g. tactical nuclear 
weapons, ballistic missile defense, and choice of strategic partners) on Iran’s perception of 
Turkey’s security and defense posture. For Turkey, the JCPOA opens up opportunities for 
additional security, economic, and energy cooperation with Iran. It also gives Turkey the 
opportunity to engage with Iran beyond economic interdependence to develop the diplomatic 
resolution of conflicts in Syria and Iraq.  
All of these steps would help Turkey reassure its key allies, adopt a more realistic assessment of 






Turkey and NATO are in a mutual crisis of confidence. Turkey is concerned about a divergence 
of its and NATO’s strategic interests, particularly in Syria; Western officials are increasingly 
concerned about Turkey being an “unreliable” ally.3 Despite the increasing lack of confidence, 
Turkey continues to have an inevitable bridging role between NATO and the Middle East and 
can provide unique contributions to security policy debates. Turkey wants to be seen as a 
valuable ally and a good partner worthy of working on joint defense projects.  
 
If Turkey’s declaratory policy toward tactical nuclear weapons shifted away from maintaining 
the status quo to elimination, it could contribute to the broader debate on NATO’s “nuclear 
sharing” strategy and the next round of nuclear reductions between the United States and Russia 
concerning the non-strategic nuclear arsenals. The absence of nuclear weapons in Turkish 
strategic thinking constitutes an opportunity to revise the policy and clarify Turkey’s intentions. 
Beyond the international implications of Turkey’s domestic political and military restructuring, a 
repositioning of external security policy and a sustainable defense industry strategy are direly 
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